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For our first assignment, we were initially asked to consider the questions "What is the 'Demarcation problem'? Why is providing a good answer to it important?" In answering these questions, I make reference to publications written by James Ladyman1 and Michael Ruse2 (see notes at the end of this article), both of whom address this problem. The problem itself, in a nutshell, is one of determining what is science, and what is not. I wrote the following:
"According to Ladyman:
'The problem of saying what is scientific and what is not is called the demarcation problem.'
Wikipedia provides the following description:
'The demarcation problem in the philosophy of science is about how to distinguish between science and nonscience, including between science, pseudoscience, other activities, and beliefs. The debate continues after over a century of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in various fields, and despite broad agreement on the basics of scientific method.'
This kind of problem is not unique to the philosophy of science. It occurs, for example in the practice of medicine. According to Ladyman, modern medicine claims to be evidence-based and therefore may claim to be scientific. Yet many forms of 'alternative medicine' exist, a number of which are not accepted by the medical establishment as being 'real medicine' because there is little or no empirical data to support their efficacy.
My understanding of what Ladyman is saying is that understanding and thinking about science is important - not just to those studying the philosophy of science but to all of us - because of the profound influence science has on all our lives. The technology we use day today is just one aspect of this. Rightly or wrongly, we tend to trust information given to us by scientists, and are more likely to accept political or legal decisions, as well as those that affect our health and safety, if those decisions have been informed by a scientific process.
There are, according to Ladyman, differing views among philosophers as to the nature of the philosophy of science itself. Many philosophers, he says, reject the 'traditional conception of philosophy as a subject based on armchair reflection' in favour of an approach based on the same kind of empirical inquiry that characterises science itself ("naturalism"). He asserts, however, that such questions are:
'. . . of little use unless we know what science is, so perhaps the most fundamental task for the philosophy of science is to answer the question, 'what is science?'.'
The importance of answering this question - i.e. being able to define what is science and what is merely pseudo-science, is commensurate with the status of science in modern society. Our reliance on science in almost every aspect of our lives dictates that we take the definition of what constitutes science very seriously indeed.
Ladyman cites astrology and creationism as examples of 'pseudo-science'. Astrology is arguably a relatively harmless pseudo-science, since most of us probably regard our horoscopes merely as an amusing distraction, if we bother to read them at all, although there are a significant number of people who take it more seriously, and even make decisions based on astrological predictions that will affect their lives, perhaps profoundly.
Creationism is, potentially at any rate, a far more dangerous form of pseudo-science, because those who subscribe to it often do so unquestioningly, live their lives accordingly, and attempt to persuade others to their doctrine. Every counter argument can be refuted because inconsistencies and contradictions, even claims that fly in the face of the known laws of physics, can be explained away through "divine intervention".
It is essentially religious fundamentalism that seeks to justify itself by claiming to be a science, while reserving the right not to answer awkward questions. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this is that unlike (for example) the Flat Earth Society (yes, they still exist!), whose membership and influence is relatively insignificant, creationists often occupy positions of power and influence in society, and can potentially have a significantly negative influence on the development of human knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge."
The next two questions we are asked is "What are the necessary conditions Ruse claims something must meet in order to be science? Why does Ruse think 'creation science' fails to meet these conditions?" My answers to these questions are presented below.
"Ruse essentially claims that any body of knowledge that claims to be science must conform to some set of laws. These laws must be such that they will both explain what has happened and be able to predict what will happen in a given set of circumstances. Furthermore, these laws must be testable. A genuine scientific theory, he says, "lays itself open to check against the real world". He cites Young's 'double slit experiment' as an example. In this experiment, a coherent light source (e.g. a laser beam) is directed towards a plate with two parallel slits in it.
The light passing through the slits produces a pattern of light and dark bands on the screen, essentially proving that the light is behaving like a waveform (as opposed to a stream of particles) when it passes through the slits. The absorption pattern seen on the screen, on the other hand, suggests the involvement of particles. These results are highly significant in scientific terms, because they demonstrate the principle of wave-particle duality. The important thing to note here, however, is that the theoretical aspects can be thoroughly tested. The experiment can be repeated any number of times, and will always produce the same results.
The other side of this particular coin, Ruse says, is that 'a theory must be open to refutation'. No matter how much a scientist believes in his or her theory, they must be prepared to abandon it if all the evidence clearly proves it to be false. According to Ruse, therefore, 'A body of science must be falsifiable'. Sir Isaac Newton himself, perhaps one of the most influential figures in the history of modern science, found it necessary to abandon some of his most cherished theories during the course of his lifetime. He was also observed to have reacted most adversely to criticism of his theories, flying into a rage on occasion. Nevertheless, he would eventually abandon these false theories once sufficient evidence to discredit them was presented to him.
Scientists, Ruse insists, must demonstrate professional integrity. They must not 'cheat or falsify data or quote out of context or do any other thing that is intellectually dishonest'. He seems to suggest that creation-science requires at least a measure of self-deception on the part of its adherents. They claim to be scientists and yet hide behind ad-hoc arguments based on the notion of divine intervention to explain away any anomalies. He quotes the work of Duane Gish3 as being illustrative in this context:
'We do not know how God created, what processes He used, for God used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural universe. This is why we refer to divine creation as special creation*. We cannot discover by scientific investigations anything about the creative processes used by God.'
* Is this a nod towards special relativity?
In other words, God created everything, we don't know how because nothing we know about the universe explains it, and there is no point in trying to understand it because . . . well, he doesn't actually give a reason.
Gish's work, Ruse claims, was the 'seminal contribution that led to the growth of the creation-science movement' and yet it describes processes that are clearly not explainable by science. According to Ruse, science 'does not admit miracles'. Miracles cannot be falsified. Their very nature puts them outside the scope of falsifiability. The creation as described by Gish would surely be the greatest of all miracles, and therefore impossible to falsify. At the same time, Ruse says, creation-science 'invokes happenings and causes outside of law'. The 'special creation' as Gish calls it, apparently occurs instantaneously. Plants and animals of every kind, along with (presumably) the world itself, indeed an entire universe, suddenly appear in much the same state we can see today, undoubtedly contrary to every natural law currently known to science - or at least, real science.
Where no law exists, continues Ruse, 'neither explanation nor prediction is possible'. In terms of evolution versus creation, he refers to the fact that evolutionists attempt to explain things such as homologies (observable similarities in bone structures between largely unrelated species, for example) as being the result of common descent. Creationists, on the other hand, make no attempt to offer an alternative explanation. Indeed, they dismiss the issue of homologies as being irrelevant.
Ruse states that a scientific theory should not simply explain what we already know, but should be capable of predicting new facts, even if in doing so it exposes itself to the possibility of uncovering falsifying information. Creation-science, in contrast, appears to make no attempt to uncover new knowledge. Indeed, its underlying stance appears to be defensive. Ruse describes this stance as 'constantly protecting one's views against threat: forever inventing ad hoc hypotheses to save one's core assumptions'. He goes on to assert that, rather than coming up with theories of their own, creation-scientists 'work exclusively with the discoveries and claims of evolutionists, twisting the conclusions to their own ends'.
They focus their efforts on proving Darwinism wrong, rather than proving creationism right - an indication, perhaps, that creation-scientists are indeed unable to do the latter. Ruse argues that this approach fails, and that 'One must find one's own evidence in favour of one's position, just as physicists, chemists, and biologists do'. Ruse dismisses creation-science as a science for a number of reasons, justifiably in my view. He claims it is not science, for example, because 'there is absolutely no way creationists will budge from their position' even in the face of irrefutable evidence, and accuses them of having no integrity because of the way in which they 'distort evolutionists' positions or use inappropriate or incomplete quotations'.
Ultimately, Ruse proposes that creation science fulfils none of the characteristics required of a true science, relying instead on an acceptance of the miraculous nature of a creation brought about by 'an intervening supervising force' (i.e. God). He calls it 'dogmatic religious Fundamentalism' and a 'blasphemous distortion of God-given reason'. Ruse's position could, I suppose, be said to be fairly extreme, in so far as he does not seem willing to compromise or yield any ground whatsoever to the notion of creation-science. Nevertheless, I find myself agreeing with him on almost every point."
The remaining questions all deal with the question of whether or not Astrology could be considered to be a science. I list each of these questions below, followed by my answers:
Using Ruse's conditions, determine whether astrology is eligible to count as scientific.
"To answer this, we need to consider the following questions:
Berkely University has an interesting web page that deals with this question. To quote their introductory text:
'In some ways, astrology may seem scientific. It uses scientific knowledge about heavenly bodies, as well as scientific sounding tools, like star charts. Some people use astrology to generate expectations about future events and people's personalities, much as scientific ideas generate expectations. And some claim that astrology is supported by evidence — the experiences of people who feel that astrology has worked for them. But even with these trappings of science, is astrology really a scientific way to answer questions?'"
So, does astrology conform to an identifiable set of laws?
"Arguably, yes. It uses genuine astrological data to make its predictions, and has rules for making predictions, although upon close examination the rules are somewhat open to interpretation. Indeed, astronomers often disagree among themselves on how to interpret the astrological data. Then again, scientists do not always agree on the interpretation of empirical data, so this is not really conclusive."
Are the laws testable?
"The astronomical data underlying astrology is eminently testable, but the supposed effects of planetary influences on people and events cannot really be proven or disproven – there are simply too many unknowns, for one thing, and the predictions are often highly generalised."
Are explanation and prediction features of astrology?
"To an extent, albeit in a very limited sense. Astrologists attempt to explain how the motions of the planets bring about certain conditions that affect people and events, although these explanations are rarely if ever sufficiently detailed enough to be considered satisfactory. As for prediction . . . well, on the face of it yes. The problem here is that the predictions are usually so vague that they can neither be proven nor disproven."
Is astrological theory falsifiable?
"Once again this is difficult to answer, since the underlying knowledge is based on astronomical data. The astrological rule-based system of predictions based upon that data, on the other hand, is almost impossible to assess simply because, as I mentioned above, there are so many variables involved.
Conclusion
Astrology has been around for many centuries, and for many of those centuries it was highly respected and enjoyed the status of a science. A strict interpretation of Ruse's criteria, however, would certainly disqualify astrology as a science on pretty much all counts. To put it simply, despite the fact that it relies on astronomical data that is eminently verifiable, and makes predictions based on what are often incredibly complex calculations, when examined closely there is just not enough in the way of substance to justify calling astrology a science.
The lack of consensus among astrologers about what astrology can predict is perhaps akin to the disagreements that often occur between scientists over particular scientific theories (take for example the differing versions of how the universe came into being, i.e. big bang theory verses steady-state theory). Nevertheless, there are other factors that must be considered here. Many astrologers, for example, have a surprisingly poor knowledge of astronomy in general, and in particular often do not understand the nature of the movements of the planets themselves - the very foundation, one would think, of their 'science'.
Perhaps the biggest problem, as far as I am concerned, is that the very nature of astrology makes it fundamentally flawed. I refer to the fact that those people who take it seriously often base their decisions on its predictions. The prediction itself, therefore, not only suggests future events, but actually influences them. I personally tend to look at astrologers in the same way I look at fortune tellers. I ask myself this question: If I could really make accurate predictions about the future, would I be sitting in a booth telling fortunes, or earning a pittance writing a weekly astrology column in my local newspaper? I rather think I would be making a fortune on the stock market and spending the rest of my days, or at least a goodly number of them, on a beach somewhere tropical. But maybe that's just me."
Notes: